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adabiweekly@ada.edu.az

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THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REORDERED: NEW CHALLENGES TO BAKU'S FOREIGN POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

Paul Goble
Publications Advisor
Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy

Since Russia invaded Georgia the geopolitics of the South Caucasus has been transformed, with new players entering the scene and old ones changing their position on the board. And despite the often dizzying pace of the last six months, events over the last few weeks suggest that the pace of change may be on the increase, a trend that, if it continues, is certain to lead to some radical discontinuities in the policies and actions of all the governments involved in the region.

No country has been more profoundly affected by these most recent changes than Azerbaijan and no changes have been more striking than in three of the traditional players in the region. Thanks to enhanced Russian security assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan's main adversary, and to expanding ties between Turkey,

Azerbaijan's closest ally, on the one hand, and Russia and Armenia, on the other, many of the assumptions that have guided Baku's policies for more than a decade are now being called into question.

And such questioning which seems certain to spread from the pages of Baku's major news outlets to that country's parliament and foreign ministry could result in some equally dramatic discontinuities in Azerbaijani foreign policy, not only with regard to these three countries – that is almost a certainty – but also concerning other states with which Baku regularly interacts but who may assume that the transformation of the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus will not affect them.

Russia has always been Armenia's chief ally and provider of military equipment, but Moscow has taken two steps in the last six weeks that raise the stakes in that relationship. On the one hand, in early January, evidence came to light that the Russian government has supplied 800 million US dollars of military equipment to Yerevan, a transfer that Moscow officials have denied just as they have denied earlier supplies and just as unconvincingly. And on the other, on February 13, Nikolai Bordyuzha, the secretary general of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization announced that Russia and Armenia have agreed to establish "an integrated air defense network" on the model of the Russian-Belarus net.

Many in Moscow would argue that these steps simply restore the balance in the South Caucasus given Azerbaijan's increasing expenditure on its military and occasional statements by Azerbaijani leaders that they are prepared to use force to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute if nothing else works. But in fact, a more balanced assessment suggests that Moscow, after its successful (in its eyes) intervention in Georgia, is prepared to use force either directly or indirectly to support those countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States which back Russian positions and to put pressure on all others in its "near abroad" which seek greater independence from Moscow.

This enhanced Russian security assistance to Armenia has both immediate and longer term consequences. In the short term, it reduces pressure on Armenia to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute: After all, given Russian involvement, Azerbaijan would be unlikely to challenge Armenia because it would be challenging Russia as well. But in the longer term, it means that Baku will have ever greater difficulty in viewing Moscow as an honest broker concerning that conflict, and it means, as some in Azerbaijan have already suggested, that Baku should revisit its commitment to the OSCE Minsk Group, which is now the primary place for negotiations about Nagorno-Karabakh, or even its membership in the Russian-dominated CIS. Given the broader constellation of forces, neither of those steps is likely to occur soon, but the fact that questions of this kind are now being asked in Azerbaijan is a product of the changed geopolitical map of the South Caucasus.

The second major shift in this region in recent months has been Turkey's rapprochement with Russia, a reflection of Ankara's desire to play a larger role in the Caucasus and elsewhere as well but a development that is helping Moscow to expand its role in the region after the Georgian war. That new order of things was highlighted by the visit to Moscow February 12-13 by Turkish President Abdullah Gul during which he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed what Kremlin press officers described as "a strategic document" pointing to closer ties in the future.

Since last summer, Gul has been pushing the idea of a Platform for Security and Stability in the Caucasus, a program still in the process of definition but one that he has indicated will be open to all countries in the region, including Armenia and quite possibly Iran, and will give Russia a special role. On the one hand, Baku can only welcome Turkey's new activism in the Caucasus, something Azerbaijanis have long counted on given their own view of Turkey as the country with which they have the closest cultural and even political ties.

But on the other, Turkey's rapprochement with Russia raises questions about Ankara's continued declarations of a special relationship with Azerbaijan. If Ankara wants to play an expanded regional role, its moves with regard to Russia raise questions about whether it will downgrade, at least relatively, the importance it attaches to Azerbaijan. And that at the very least is raising questions in the Azerbaijani media about what is going on. If Azerbaijan cannot count on Turkey being always in its corner, then Azerbaijan's leadership will have to think long and hard about how it can pursue a balanced foreign policy between Ankara and the West and Moscow and the CIS.

That is all the more so because of the third tectonic shift in the region: Turkey's exploration of closer ties with Armenia. Since the "football" diplomacy of last summer when President Gul visited Yerevan, contacts between Armenia and Turkey have expanded with a series of meetings in both countries and in international settings like Davos. Although Turkish officials continue to insist that their commitment to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity remains unchanged and although Ankara has its own reasons for pursuing these ties – including not unimportantly the reduction of the influence of the Armenian diaspora's push for international recognition of 1915 as a genocide – Ankara's actions are changing the geopolitical framework in the Caucasus as well.

On the one hand, if these contacts lead to a greater opening of the already partially porous Armenian-Turkish border, Armenia will be under significantly less pressure to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Not only will it have more opportunities for trade, but its geographic isolation will be reduced. (Some would say that this would reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia as well, but it seems clear that Yerevan is unlikely to downgrade that tie whatever happens in its relations with Turkey).

And on the other, to the extent that Turkey expands its ties with Yerevan, Ankara may feel less compelled to line up with Azerbaijan on all issues. At the very least, that means that Azerbaijan will feel less certain that it can count on Turkey and that very uncertainty will produce greater insecurity in the minds of many. Consequently, Turkey's rapprochement with Armenia will reinforce the view that Ankara's growing ties with Moscow undermine rather than help Azerbaijan.

One of the reasons for these rather dire conclusions is that the rhetoric coming out of Moscow about the Nabucco project in which Azerbaijan has invested so much effort is truly hyperbolic. At the end of January, Moscow's *Kommersant-Vlast* suggested that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is in fact considering provoking a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan not only to block the flow of Caspian Basin gas westward bypassing Russia but to increase Russian influence in the South Caucasus.

That report was reinforced by the remarks of Aleksandr Dugin, the Eurasian Party leader who is known to be close to the Russian leadership. He told *Novosti* on January 31 that Nabucco has to be wrecked at any cost because “we are talking about the geopolitics of gas.” Consequently, if Russia needs to use military tools to do so, Dugin continued, Moscow “should [take that step] without any hesitation.”

Such language is almost certainly intended less as a prediction of what Russia will do than as a way of putting additional pressure on regional actors like Azerbaijan. But given Moscow’s intervention in Georgia last summer and the geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus since that time, such words in and of themselves seem certain to cause more people in Baku to rethink Azerbaijan’s approach to foreign policy and thus at the very least to spark a new debate about many things that most analysts had thought settled long ago.

CAN TURKEY AND ARMENIA NORMALIZE THEIR RELATIONS?

Mitat Celikpala
Associate Professor
TOBB University of Economics and Technologies

Despite the attention Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s clash with Israeli president over Gaza attracted in the media, a far more important event at the Davos session as far as Ankara was concerned was a successful exchange between the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers which appears likely to set the stage for the two countries to move beyond the football diplomacy of last fall when Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan.

Following their meeting in Davos, both Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and his Armenian counterpart Edvard Nalbandyan said “normalization in Armenian-Turkish relations is no longer a dream” and that “we have never come this much closer to normalization in bilateral relations.” And Turkish commentators pointed to talks in Helsinki in December 2008 and Istanbul at the end of January this year as indicative of forward progress in the relationship as well as to the visit of Nalbandyan to Istanbul in his capacity as chairman-in-office of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation as examples of détente between the countries.

And at the people-to-people level, not only are more Armenians visiting Turkey as tourists but also more Armenians are working there, a trend to which Turkish officials are turning a blind eye. But despite all this, the glass is still half-empty rather than half-full, with many critical issues, including Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, Nagorno-Karabakh, the genocide issue, and the negative attitude of the Armenian diaspora toward Turkey still far from any resolution.

Given the enormity of these issues, the Turkish foreign ministry has found it extremely difficult to craft a policy for Armenia and the South Caucasus. And perhaps as a result, many people in Turkey and abroad have criticized Ankara for what it has not done. Here, I want to avoid that approach and to consider somewhat

different issues: what is or at least might be the reason Turkey is pursuing an opening with Armenia and where could that pursuit lead.

The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 not only focused Turkish attention on the Caucasus, but prompted Ankara to elaborate a security proposal largely independent of its traditional alliances and thus open to a rapprochement with Armenia. Despite diaspora criticism, Armenia has responded positively to this. But other forces may be at work here as well.

Some have speculated that Ankara took this step not so much as an initiative of its own but rather as a way to block the US Congress from passing a resolution that would declare official American support for the idea that 1915 was a genocide. Those who make that argument point to comments made during the recent American electoral campaign by both now President Barack Obama and now Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Beyond any question, however, Armenia occupies a prominent place in Turkey's policy toward the Caucasus. Ankara's economic and strategic engagement with the region has developed in many cases with an eye to the relations of the various players, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, toward Armenia. And its backing for the principle of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and many of its geopolitical and economic successes in the region show that it is possible for Turkey to pursue a successful regional policy without Armenia and sometimes despite Armenia.

That achievement gives Ankara important leverage in Yerevan, especially since an increasing number of Armenians recognize that their country must develop stable relations with neighboring countries like Turkey if Armenia is to prosper economically and succeed politically. But the two countries are far apart on key issues and so progress toward that state of affairs almost certainly will be slow, even though Turkey too would benefit from improved ties. And nowhere is progress likely to be slower than in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, where Turkey and Armenia occupy diametrically opposed positions.

The possibility of three party talks on that subject, including Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia, represents a step forward, but far from a conclusive one. Nonetheless, statements by Turkish and Armenian officials about "approaching normalization" do make sense and could lead to a thawing of this "frozen" conflict, especially if the talks take place and public opinion is swayed as a result.

Another element in this emerging relationship between Ankara and Yerevan is Turkey's hope that it can use such ties to reduce the influence of the Armenian diaspora. If the Obama administration ends up supporting the diaspora position on 1915, that would not only increase tensions between Ankara and Washington but also reduce the significance of Armenia for Turkey, something officials in Ankara and Washington certainly know.

And consequently, just how important each of these factors is in Turkish and Armenian calculations will become clear very soon, although because there are so many at work, the impulse for normalization at one speed or another between Turkey and Armenia is likely to continue.

KILLING TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE?

Gulnara Inandzh
Director

International Online Information Analytic Center *Ethnoglobus*

Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia complicated the ethnic situation in the entire Caucasus by creating favorable conditions for the exacerbation of ethnic self-consciousness among many groups and for the manipulation of some of these groups by various countries both in the region and beyond.

The activities of the Circassians who hope to unite the members of their ethnos into a single republic have attracted a great deal of attention, but developments in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a Georgian region populated largely by ethnic Armenians have not, although for many reasons, what is going on there may have even greater immediate consequences.

At the start of this year, the Georgian authorities – as they have in the past sought to prevent the situation in Samtskhe-Javakhetia from getting out of hand – arrested several activists, who Armenians said are completely “innocent.” But almost at the same moment this exchange occurred, an unusual declaration by Dashgyn Gulmammadov, the president of the National Assembly of Azerbaijanis of Georgia, was released.

That declaration [1] called for Georgia to be transformed into a confederation of Georgians, Abkhazians and Ossetians. But despite its Azerbaijani origin, it did not call for ethnic Azerbaijanis to gain autonomy, limiting itself to the demand that in this new state, Azerbaijani should be one of the state languages. A similar idea surfaced during the Russian-Georgian war of last August. At that time, its authors were citizens of the Russian Federation and an ethnic Azerbaijani from Iran now living in Sweden.

And this declaration, by a strange coincidence appearing at the time of the Javakhetia events but one not strange at all if these groups are being manipulated by Moscow and Yerevan, also called for giving the ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan, in particular the Talysh, Avars and Lazgis, similar rights. By putting out such statements, those who issue them and even more the people who are orchestrating this hope to weaken and fragment Georgia and Azerbaijan and to limit the options of both Tbilisi and Baku.

Confirmation of this is provided by the following: During the most recent arrests in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, Armenian commentators hurried to accuse Azerbaijan of being behind events there. In this way, Yerevan sought to take steps to give it greater freedom of action in the future. First of all, since Javakhetia organizations, in the opinion of Georgian experts, are directed by the Armenian special services and Russia, then the shift in rhetoric toward Georgia regarding its citizens of Azerbaijani nationality beyond any doubt indicates who compiled the “Azerbaijani” declaration.

Moscow is interested in the further dismemberment of Georgia and consequently views the efforts of the Javakhetia Armenians as a completely logical next step. Azerbaijanis, on the other hand and as Georgians recognize, do not have separatist ambitions and remain loyal to the Georgian government. Changing that by a few declarations of the type cited above won't shift them from that.

Consequently, it should be obvious that claims to the contrary are simply intended to provide cover for Armenian plans. Equally indicative of what is going on is that the exacerbating of the ethnic situation in Georgia has slowed the process of the return of Meskhetian Turks to their historical lands in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, a return that Armenians of that region oppose.

And the sponsors of this exploitation of ethnic minority aspirations have promoted their ideas via scholarly conferences about these communities, propaganda about the dangers of Pan-Turanism and the assimilation of peoples living in Azerbaijan, and the creation of websites which speak out in defense of the rights of ethnic communities living there, to name just a few. Lazgis, Udins, Tats, Jews, and Kurds who alongside Azerbaijanis and Turks at the beginning of the 20th century were killed by the thousand by Dashnaks have suddenly been transformed into the brothers of the Armenians. Indeed, Armenian websites are ready to post materials about the interrelationships of the indigenous peoples of Azerbaijan with the power structure which exists in this republic and about the means of expanding relations between them and the Armenian people. [2]

The latest and especially gratuitous example of this involves the dissemination by the Armenian information agency *Panarmenian.net* of reports about "Jewish pogroms" in Sumgait this month, events which someone at the agency or somewhere else invented out of whole cloth. There were no such "pogroms." But reports that they were, however false, may help the Armenian lobby in the United States to push through a Congressional resolution about the Armenian genocide. And it is possible that they were directed at complicating relations between Israel and Turkey.

Armenia, even as it remains in occupation of Azerbaijani territory, has always sought to convince the world that the rights of ethnic minorities are not protected in Azerbaijan and consequently that it would be unthinkable to return the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to a position in which they would be threatened by discrimination and destruction. The ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan and "the defense of their rights" thus remain under the constant control of political operatives in Armenia.

Unfortunately, this effort is often supplemented by the dispatch of Islamic groups and even criminal elements into Azerbaijan where they pose as "defenders" of the interests of ethnic Daghestanis. Indeed, the appearance in Daghestan of the youth movement Anti-Turan, the goal of which is the struggle with the spread of Turkish throughout the Caucasus, is a measure of the lengths Armenia and its Russian backers are prepared to go to promote anti-Azerbaijani attitudes. [3]

Notes

[1] *Regnum* (2009), 'Настало время добиваться своих национальных целей: президент Национальной ассамблеи азербайджанцев Грузии', January 30,

available at <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1118358.html> (accessed February 12, 2009).

[2] E.g. explore <http://www.voskanapat.info>.

[3] *Khabal.info* (2009) 'Заявление молодежного патриотического движения "Анти-Туран"', January 18, available at http://khabal.info/?l=rus&act=inf_view&id=314722122100%55522%5566661 (accessed February 12, 2009).

A CHRONOLOGY OF AZERBAIJAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

I. Key Government Statements on Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

President Ilham Aliyev says in an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* that the upcoming referendum over constitutional amendments that would allow him to run for a third term is "a democratic procedure and reflects the expressed will of the people." He adds that it fully corresponds to European standards. In other comments, President Aliyev says that Baku is fully within its rights to regulate the re-broadcasting of international radio and television stations on local outlets.

President Ilham Aliyev further says in an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be resolved on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution which calls for the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territory. He notes that negotiations have been going on for 15 years since the ceasefire agreement but "the conflict all the same has still not been resolved." The Azerbaijani leader adds that the co-chairs of the Minsk Group have reaffirmed even after the Georgian conflict that they will not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.

II. Key Statements by Others about Azerbaijan

Javier Solana, the EU official responsible for that organization's foreign policy, says that "a military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict does not exist," something he says should be "evident after the Georgian crisis".

Terry Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, says that the Council "has always supported the territorial integrity of all member countries" and thus supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. In other comments, he says that he expects a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute before the end of his term in office.

Matthew Bryza, US deputy assistant secretary of state and co-chair of the Minsk Group, says that he does "not expect any document to be signed in connection with Nagorno-Karabakh this summer".

A NATO official speaking on condition of anonymity says that Azerbaijan has already created an army "capable of conducting military actions of an offensive character," although he adds that it would be impossible for Azerbaijani forces to liberate the

occupied territories as rapidly as Azerbaijani Milli Majlis deputy Baba Tagiyev had suggested. Tagiyev had said that Azerbaijan could liberate the region "in the course of 48 hours".

III. A Chronology of Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

15 February

Turkish President Abdulla Gul expresses his sympathies to President Ilham Aliyev and the Azerbaijani people on the death of Azerbaijani poet Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, who Gul notes was extremely well-known in Turkey.

13 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, who is currently serving as the president of the European Union. The two discuss Azerbaijan's relationship with the EU and the role of the Czech Republic in the Nabucco project.

President Ilham Aliyev in an interview with Russian media outlets says that "the only thing [Baku] has not been able to achieve is the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict." In all other spheres, including the economy, national security, and social welfare, the Azerbaijani leader adds, Baku has been remarkably successful.

President Ilham Aliyev receives Goran Lennmarker, the special representative of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Earlier, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov meets with the OSCE official and reaffirms that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be resolved only on the basis of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov meets with British foreign office representatives to discuss the development of the European Union's Eastern Partnership program.

Pieter de Haep, the Director-General for Political Affairs of the Dutch foreign ministry, tells Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov that the Hague supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and that this principle must be the basis of any resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

12 February

Azerbaijan foreign ministry spokesman Khazar Ibrahim says that Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan is using terms to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute that have no meaning, including such notions as "the people of Nagorno-Karabakh." There is "no such people," Khazar Ibrahim says, there are only Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in that part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

11 February

President Ilham Aliyev returns from a two-day visit to Kuwait where he met with Sheikh Sabah al-amed al-Jabir as Sabah and other senior officials to discuss relations between the two countries.

Turkish Ambassador to Azerbaijan Hulusi Kylyc says that Ankara wants to do everything it can to “stimulate” moves toward the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and urges both parties to work in the framework of the Platform of Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus Turkey has proposed.

Azerbaijan foreign ministry spokesman Khazar Ibrahim says that information published in the Turkish newspaper *Hurriyet* about the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is “absurd” and should be ignored.

US Ambassador to Azerbaijan Ann Derse says that the United States “will construct its policy in the Caucasus on the basis of intensive diplomacy.” She stresses that Azerbaijan is “a very important partner” of the United States and will remain so under the new US Administration.

9 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babajan.

David Wilshire, the head of the newly created subcommittee of PACE on conflicts in the post-Soviet space, says that his group “must study and understand the specific features of ongoing and past frozen conflicts including Nagorno-Karabakh.”

French Ambassador to Azerbaijan Gabriel Keller says that any changes in the constitution of Azerbaijan are “an internal affair” of Azerbaijan.

8 February

Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babadjan says that he hopes that “the negotiation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia will give positive results” and that his country is committed to the re-establishment of peace and stability in the South Caucasus.

7 February

Khalaf Khalafov, Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister, presents Azerbaijan’s national report on human rights to a Geneva session of the UN Council on Human Rights.

Austrian foreign ministry officials announce that Vienna will open an embassy in Baku in the near future and looks forward to working more closely with Azerbaijan on Nabucco and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

6 February

President Ilham Aliyev receives the letters of credence from the incoming ambassadors of Vietnam, Benin, Nigeria, Yemen, Angola, Estonia, the UAR, Sri-Lanka, Zimbabwe, and India.

5 February

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov receives copies of the letters of credence of the incoming ambassadors from Estonia (Aivo Orava) and Angola (Titu Armando).

4 February

Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov tells visiting Polish Foreign Minister Andrei Kramer that "Armenia had remained outside of major regional projects because of its occupation of part of the territory of Azerbaijan." Mammadyarov says that he believes that Poland has a special role to play in the development of the European Union's Eastern Partnership program.

Novruz Mammadov, the head of the foreign relations department of the Executive Apparatus of President Ilham Aliyev, says that Baku looked forward to the development of the Eastern Partnership but that "unfortunately, our relations with the EU are not at the level that we would like," a level based on "equal partnership".

Novruz Mammadov, the head of the foreign relations department of the Executive Apparatus of President Ilham Aliyev, accuses Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan of cowardice. The Armenian leader, Mammadov says, "lacked the courage" to discuss many of the most important issues with Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev when the two were in Switzerland for the Davos meetings. The Azerbaijani advisor adds that as has happened in the past, the Armenian side has gone back on its promises.

Milli Majlis deputy Azai Guliyev, a member of the Azerbaijani delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, says that Baku intends to ask that organization at its meeting in Vienna February 17-21 to appoint a special rapporteur on the issue of Russia's transfer of 800 million US dollars in military equipment to Armenia.

3 February

A NATO official speaking on condition of anonymity says that Azerbaijan has already created an army "capable of conducting military actions of an offensive character" although he adds that it would be impossible for Azerbaijani forces to liberate the occupied territories as rapidly as Azerbaijani Milli Majlis deputy Baba Tagiyev had suggested. Tagiyev had said that Azerbaijan could liberate the region "in the course of 48 hours".

2 February

Milli Majlis announces plans to send a group of deputies to Moscow to meet with members of the Russian Duma concerning the transfer of Russian arms to Armenia.

Milli Majlis deputy Samed Seyidov, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, says that if the Council does not stop applying double standards to Azerbaijan, then Baku will have to consider reviewing its relations with that organization. He points to the very different way the Council has treated Azerbaijan as compared to Armenia.

Note to Readers

The editors of "Azerbaijan in the World" hope that you find it useful and encourage you to submit your comments and articles via email (adabiweekly@ada.edu.az). The materials it contains reflect the personal views of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.